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Abstract 
The United States has one of the lowest election turnout rates in the developed world. 
Consequently, social scientists are perpetually seeking to expand upon their knowledge of what 
factors are associated with voting, or the lack thereof. Commonly identified factors including 
age, income, educational attainment and race have been studied extensively (Pew, 2006; 
Leighley & Nagler, 2013; Hilty, 2013). However, there is one plausible factor associated with 
voting that might be underappreciated: the effect of private schooling. The limited literature that 
exists on the topic suggests that private schools, the majority of them Catholic, have a positive 
effect on civic outcomes, including voter participation. In using a rich, nationally representative 
dataset--the Understanding America Study based out of the University of Southern California-- I 
can reexamine whether attending a private school has an effect on whether Americans vote. I can 
also shed light on a heretofore unanswered question: How does private schooling impact which 
candidate an individual supports? Overall, the data indicates that private schooling appears to 
have no impact on voter turnout, but that attending some private school appears to have a 
liberalizing effect.  
Motivation 
Democratic norms 
 Voting matters. From an abstract perspective, we as a democratic society ought to ascribe 
value to voting, an exercise in democracy that Alexander Hamilton labeled “one of the most 
important rights of the subject… That right by which we exist as a free people.” (Hamilton, 
1879, p. 30). From a policy perspective, low voter turnout has practical consequences. Because 
minorities and low-income voters turn out at disproportionately low rates, their policy objectives 
go unfulfilled and economic policy is less redistributive than those voters would desire. (Meltzer 
& Richard, 1983; Hajnal, 2015). Moreover, President Trump secured a victory over Hillary 
Clinton with only 80,000 additional votes across three states while President Bush triumphed by 
537 votes in Florida (Purdum, 2000). Simply put, small changes in who votes or how people vote 
can and do have dramatic consequences, even in national elections. 
Forthcoming education reforms 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3068996 
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It stands to reason that childhood experiences influence whether and how people vote. 
Consequently, it should also be true that school experiences influence voting behavior, as 
individuals spend a significant amount of their formative years within schools, which help to 
form their attitudes about the world around them. I seek to understand the effect of private 
schooling on voting behavior because access to vouchers is likely to increase under the 
leadership of Secretary DeVos, a battle-hardened voucher advocate. If private school enrollment 
increases as expected, then rigorous research should inform the consequential effects, which 
might include changes in voting behavior.   
Lack of understanding 
 2016 was a strange election year that continually defied expectations. In July 2015 Pivit, 
an interactive data collection platform that combined polls, predictive analysis, wagering markets 
and social sentiment to generate odds estimated that Donald Trump had a 1% chance of securing 
the GOP nomination (Diaz, 2015). Four days before the election, Sam Wang, founder of the 
highly reputable Princeton Election Consortium, pegged Trump’s odds of winning the general 
election at 1% (Revesz, 2016). Suffice it to say forecasting elections remains more art than 
science, and we have a long way to go in terms of understanding voting behavior.   
 
Literature Review 
Private schools and likelihood of voting 
 There is some high-quality instructive literature examining the effect of private school on 
the likelihood of voting, as highlighted by Wolf’s (2007) meta-analysis of the effect of schools of 
choice on civic values. Dee (2005) used a probit model and instrumental variables (Catholic 
religious affiliation, local density of Catholic high schools and availability of mass transit) to 
find that Catholic school enrollment in the United States is associated with an approximately 
10% increase in an individual’s likelihood of voting. Similarly, Dill (2009) employs a national 
dataset to find that private school enrollment is associated with an increased self-report of voting 
when using logistic regression and controlling for socioeconomic characteristics.  Smith and 
Sikkink (1999) used the National Household Education Surveys Program (NHES) and conducted 
multiple-variable regression analysis that controlled for socioeconomic factors, age, race, and 
region and found that Catholic and Christian school-goers are significantly more civically 
engaged, including voting in recent elections. Moreover, their study revealed that there are 
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appreciable differences between parents who send their kids to public school and parents who 
send their kids to private school. Of particular importance is their finding that parents of private 
school-educated students were up to 15 percent more likely to have voted in recent elections. If 
civic-minded parents have civic-minded kids as one would expect, then these findings 
underscore the need for models to properly control for parent-level covariates.  
Greene, Mellow, and Giammo (1999) used a logit model with location, age, religious 
affiliation and socioeconomic controls to find that among Texas adults attending some private 
school is associated with a higher probability of voting. Interestingly, however, they find that 
adults who received all of their education in a private school did not have a statistically 
significant increased probability of voting. That curious finding squares with other literature 
concerning the effect of private schooling on civic values. For example, Greene & Kingsbury 
(2017) found that private schooling had a statistically and practically significant positive effect 
on anti-Semitic attitudes but that the dosage effect became slightly negative after approximately 
seven years of private education. In other words, an adult who received half of their K-12 
education in a private school would be less anti-Semitic than an adult who received none of their 
education there and also less anti-Semitic than an adult who attended for twelve years. Whatever 
the cause, these findings underscore the need for the models to allow the relationship between 
voting outcomes and private school enrollment to be flexible.  
In addition to these studies, there are two instructive experimental studies. Fleming, 
Mitchell and McNally (2014) employed survey data from the Milwaukee voucher program to 
investigate the impact of choice schools on civic outcomes. They polled currently enrolled high 
school students and find that after controlling for parent-level covariates, 66% of voucher lottery 
winners claimed they would vote in the future compared to 55% of lottery losers, a spread 
closely resembling Dee’s instrumental variable estimate. Their methodology while ostensibly 
causal is not without concern, as self-prediction of voting is notoriously unreliable. Indeed, a 
large share of people who claim that they intend to vote will not do so. More surprisingly, up to 
half of those who claim that they will not vote do in fact vote (Rogers & Aida, 2012). Asking 
high school students about their intention to vote years in the future likely only compounds the 
measurement error.  
Carlson, Chingos and Campbell (2016) compared the civic outcomes of winners and 
losers of the New York Choice Scholarships Foundation Program lottery by matching the 
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treatment and control groups to official voting records and found no distinguishable differences 
in outcomes in recent elections. Of course, both experimental studies come with a caveat 
regarding external validity: Private schools in New York City and Milwaukee are not necessarily 
representative of private schools nationwide, and it would be unsound to assume that the same 
effect would hold up in other regions.  
Private schools and partisanship  
 There is scant literature informing how attending a private school might affect political 
affiliation or partisanship. Paterson (2000) performed a content analysis of textbooks used at 
Christian parochial schools (which constitute the majority of private schools in the United States) 
and reported that they espoused ideologically conservative viewpoints by means of integrating 
religious and nonreligious material and citing conservative thinkers with approval while omitting 
or downplaying more progressive thinkers. Paterson predicts that this conservative curriculum 
might influence later-in-life outcomes, opining that “such training might increase the 
Balkanization of our society” (p. 1).  
Data 
 Data is drawn from the Understanding America Study (UAS) based out of the University 
of Southern California. The UAS is a nationally representative internet panel of 6,000 American 
adults in which respondents are asked to complete surveys on a wide variety of topics, from 
knowledge about the Ebola virus to sleeping patterns. To ensure that the sample is in fact 
nationally representative and to mitigate concerns about non-response bias, tablets with internet 
access were distributed to individuals to respondents with unreliable access. Moreover, to ensure 
an acceptably high response rate respondents were incentivized on a per minute basis up to $20. 
For the purposes of this study I combined several datasets which together contain the 
variables necessary to model whether there are differences in the likelihood of voting between 
private school educated adults and public school educated adults after controlling for a variety of 
background characteristics. These datasets range from 1,760 observations to 6,422 observations 
and from a response rate of 74.25% to 95.34%. One of these datasets, labeled UAS 1, was 
dispensed to each individual within the UAS and contained post-stratification weights ensure that 
survey representative of the US population with regard to socio-demographic composition. I 
have used that weight in the models that follow.  
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Note that the dependent variable is self-reported voting in a post-election poll; 
respondents were asked whether they voted in the 2012, 2014 and 2016 national elections and 
who they voted for. At first glance the percentage of respondents who claim to have voted- 
92.5% in 2016, 63% in 2014 and 77% in 2012-could generate concerns about whether the 
sample is in fact nationally representative. However, there are two sensible explanations to allay 
such fears. First, voter over-reporting is a well-known phenomenon in social science research 
(Clausen, 1968; Hanmer, Banks & White, 2013), as “people tend to over-estimate the likelihood 
that they performed a socially desirable behavior in the past and to over-estimate the likelihood 
that they will perform a socially desirable behavior in the future” (Rogers & Aida, p. 3). 
Estimates of over-reporting range from about 8 to 14% (Belli, Traugott, and Beckmann, 2001) to 
as high as 20% (Martinez, 2003; McDonald, 2003). Second, it is likely that respondents within 
the UAS experienced something akin to Hawthorne effects in experimental research, in which 
members of the experiment modify their behavior because they are being observed. Specifically, 
it is likely that being repeatedly polled about the election increases interest in the outcome and 
one’s likelihood of voting, a situation exacerbated by the fact that the rolling poll gained national 
attention in the summer of 2016 because it was one of few national election polls to predict a 
Trump victory. Unless private school educated adults and public schools educated adults are 
misrepresenting their voting history at different rates, something that is not intuitively expected, 
then the artificially high estimates are not a concern, as the purpose of the models is to observe 
differentiation in voting between private school and public school educated adults. 
 
Methods and Results 
 Likelihood of voting 
Unadjusted results confirm the original hypothesis that private school educated adults are 
more likely to vote. Indeed, each additional year of private school is associated with a .25%-
.75% increase in voting within the past three national elections. Moreover, unadjusted results 
indicate that private-school educated adults closely resembled the rest of the population during 
the 2012 election, but in 2016 each additional year of private school was associated with a 1.1% 
decrease in the likelihood of voting for Trump. 
Of course, unadjusted results are not a particularly useful measure of the effect of private 
schooling on voting, as enrolling in a private school is not random but correlated with factors 
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predictive of voting. T-tests indicate that an adult who was enrolled in any private school is 
10.5% less likely to have reported financial struggles during childhood and 40% more likely to 
identify as Catholic. Both differences are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. 
Given that those characteristics are positively correlated with voting, it is readily apparent that 
the unadjusted results do not render a meaningful look at the effect of private school vis-à-vis 
voting. Several models will be introduced to estimate the effect of private schooling on turnout 
and partisanship. I begin with a probit model to estimate the effect on turnout:  
Pr(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖 = 1|𝑋)  = 𝛷 (𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖
2 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑈𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + ε𝑖) 
These controls are intended to attenuate the endogeneity in the decision to enroll a child 
in a private school. Consequently, I control for childhood characteristics rather than adult ones. 
This has two benefits. First, they are more meaningful in terms of mitigating endogeneity. An 
adult’s income or educational attainment should have no predictive power of whether that 
individual’s parents decided to enroll them in a private school as a child. Rather, the parents’ 
income and educational attainment has explanatory power. Moreover, characteristics such as 
religiosity, cognitive abilities, income or educational attainment could plausibly be part of the 
treatment of attending a private school, and controlling for them may be problematic. If being 
enrolled in a private school effects these outcomes, then controlling for them biases the estimated 
effect. 
Still, post-educational covariates are not entirely without merit. Considering that 
individuals tend to vote the same way as their parents (Lyons, 2005), controlling for political 
ideology in voting turnout models does have some benefit, as it proxies for the political beliefs of 
their parents, which is perhaps the most obvious omitted variable. Measuring religiosity serves 
much the same purpose. Consequently, I also offer models that control for income using 
household income brackets, religiosity (proxied by how often the individual attends religious 
services), intelligence (using combined scores from numerical and literacy tests) and political 
ideology (measured on a 1-10 Likert scale). Including these covariates also adds the benefit of 
better understanding the causal mechanism insofar as an effect does exist. For example, it might 
be observed that a positive effect becomes null once controlling for political affiliation. If that 
were the case then it could be reasonably deduced that either private school enrollment begets 
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religiosity which increases voting, or that students enrolled in private schools hail from religious 
backgrounds, which is what actually driving the effect.   
 Note that 2012, 2014, and 2016 elections outcomes are not pooled but treated as unique 
phenomena, as each election is indeed distinctive, and effects vary from election to election. A 
glance at appendix section A illustrates the rationale: African Americans were about 20 
percentage points more likely to vote in Obama’s reelection campaign, all else equal, but 
practically indistinguishable from other groups in the subsequent midterm election.  
 Overall, I find no statistically significant result in any election year, a finding which is 
not sensitive to model specification (see appendix A). However, that is not incontrovertible proof 
that there is in fact no effect, but rather that the estimated effect is not distinguishable from zero. 
As figure 1 illustrates, there is some evidence to support Greene et al.’s finding that there is a 
positive effect derived from a few years of education but that civic returns from private 
education diminish or even become negative over time.  
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Figure 1: Likelihood of voting in 2014 election  
 
I would ideally consider subgroup effects for several groups, including Catholics, African 
Americans, and particularly those who report a disadvantaged childhood, as it is plausible that 
disadvantaged kids might experience a larger positive effect from private schooling. By being 
placed in a safe school environment with strong community involvement and openness to 
political discourse, they might be empowered to be civically engaged relative to comparable 
public school peers, or so the thought goes. Unfortunately, however, there are power limitations. 
The only subgroups for which I can derive a unique effect is men and women, whom the models 
estimate are practically indistinguishable with regard to a private schooling effect.  
Partisanship  
  To estimate the effect of private schooling on political party affiliation and how 
individuals cast their vote, I use the same probit model that I used for voting likelihood but 
remove the Likert scale partisanship variable from all models, as this would wash out other 
effects. Moreover, I exclusively employ age as a linear variable within these models, as I have no 
reason to suspect that the relationship between age and partisanship (ie that increased age is 
associated with conservative, Republican voting) is non-linear.  
  These models produce some interesting and perhaps surprising results. While private 
schooling did not have any practical or statistical significance in explaining how individuals cast 
their vote in the 2012 election, it did effect voting in the 2016 election, specifically with respect 
to President Trump. As Figure 2 illustrates, adults who attended some private schools were 
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significantly less likely to vote for Donald Trump (compared to all other candidates) than adults 
who only attended public schools.  
 
Figure 2: Likelihood of voting for Donald Trump  
 
 
Specifically, an adult who attended one year of private school had a 5 percentage point decrease 
in the likelihood of voting for Trump, all else equal, compared to someone exclusively educated 
in a public school while an adult who attended seven years of a private school had a 10 
percentage point decrease in the likelihood of voting for Trump, all else equal. Those with 12 
years of private education are more likely to vote for Trump than individuals with only some 
private education, but still less likely than those with 12 years of private education. Note that 
joint significance tests show some sensitivity to model specification, as controlling for 
educational attainment and intelligence lower the confidence level of the joint significance test 
below the 90% confidence level. However, these may well be part of the treatment. It is likely 
that private schools deliver a better or more tailor-made education that promotes higher 
intelligence or educational attainment. Because intelligence and attainment are negatively 
correlated with supporting Trump (see Appendix 2D), controlling for them decreases the 
magnitude of the effect.  
 Interestingly, there is no practically or statistically significant effect of private schooling 
with respect to support for Hillary Clinton (see appendix 2D), as many private-school educated 
adults opted for a third party candidate. These findings call into question whether there is in fact 
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a private school liberalizing effect, or whether private school educated adults simply turned away 
from Trump. An illustrative way to consider this is to employ the same probit model and 
examine the effect on individuals who claim to identify with the Republican platform.  
 
Figure 3: Likelihood of aligning with GOP platform  
 
As figure 3 illustrates, the results are basically replicated: A few years of private school has a 
large effect on identifying as Republican while those with 12 years of private school and 12 
years of public school are roughly equivalent. As figure 4 illustrates, the effect of private 
schooling on Democratic alignment roughly mirrors it, though the model is more sensitive to 
model specification. 
 
Figure 4: Likelihood of aligning with DNC platform  
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Discussion 
 Evidence presented in this study is descriptive. After all, being enrolled in a private 
school is not random, and it would be impossible to fully control for everything that 
distinguishes private school educated adults from public school educated adults. Nevertheless, it 
does offer suggestive evidence that private schooling has no observable effect on voting turnout, 
but an appreciably large effect on how individuals cast their vote. 
 At first blush, the observation that some private schooling is associated with progressive 
ideology is surprising. Paterson’s content analysis of Christian parochial school textbooks would 
give one the impression that private schools should produce conservative graduates. A cursory 
consideration of the modern politics of school choice only reinforces that belief. After all, 
advocacy for market-based education reform can be traced to the vanguards of the Old Right, 
whose anti statist views led them to caution, in the words of Frank Chodorov, that “What is 
known as ‘free education’ is the least free of all, for it is a state-owned institution; it is socialized 
education.” (Demarrais, 2006). Promotion of market-based solutions (and by extension, 
opposition to monopolistic government control) also became tenets of libertarian and religious 
right policy. Schools were one of the main battlegrounds in Patrick Buchanan’s “cultural war for 
the soul of America,” for public schools were, according to Pat Robertson, “destroying 
democracy in America… (Their leaders) a group of ideological extremists who are so fixated 
with their illogical educational theories that they have lost touch with reality.” (Edwards, 1998, 
p. 9).  
Logically many religious or anti-statist parents opposed to public school politics and 
curricula would place their kids in private institutions where pedagogy and practice (eg school 
prayer) are aligned with their values. Given the frequency with which kids adopt the views of 
their parents, it seems that private school-educated adults should be disproportionately 
conservative, their education notwithstanding. So why is attending a private school associated 
with progressive ideology? Part of the answer is that the decision to enroll a child in a private 
school is rarely a political one. Indeed, most families that opt for a private school do so because 
they feel that it offers a better education, better learning environment, and smaller class sizes 
(CAPE, 2013). Going further, Catholic Schools, composing a majority of private schools 
nationally, often have explicit social justice themes. In Catholic Schools and the Common Good, 
Bryk, Lee and Holland (1993) explain that with the election of President Kennedy in 1960, the 
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perceived importance of Catholic Schools to protect and nurture Catholic students in a hostile 
new world faded. However, in the tumult of the era they found a new raison d'être: social justice. 
Catholic Schools openly and sometimes even defiantly embraced pluralism, a clear affirmation 
of the spirit of the recently convened Vatican II which asserted that schools should be “enlivened 
by the spirit of freedom and charity.” (Byrk, Lee and Holland, p. 51).  
While Catholic Schools’ commitment to social justice might explain the overall private 
school liberalizing effect, an intriguing question remains: Why do adults with a few years of 
private education appear to be more progressive than those with none, while adults who spend 
their entire educational career in one setting closely resemble one another? One potential 
explanation is that those who are observed to have some years of private education have been 
exposed to a diverse range of settings, which might give them more progressive sensibilities, 
especially if the demographics of their public and private schools were unique from one another. 
Another is that parents who send their kids to private school for 12 years are fundamentally 
different in some unobservable way. In seeking to explain their finding that some private school 
exposure increases measures of tolerance but an exclusively private school setting does not, 
Greene et al. posit that “those whose families chose to send them to private school for all 12 
years did so for clear and purposeful reasons. They may have an ideological opposition to the 
type of educational experience they believe that the government-run public schools provide, for 
example.” (p. 441).  
 Perhaps the most sensible explanation is that the liberalizing effect is being driven by 
students who were enrolled in a private school during their elementary schools but not later 
during their academic years, as it plausible that the politics of private elementary schools and 
private secondary schools are quite distinct. Indeed, many private elementary schools boast high 
levels of integration and engage students with social justice themes at a young age (Miller, L. 
2015). Private high schools, on the other hand, are perhaps comparatively more religious and 
conservative (Paterson). I attempt to test this hypothesis by running the same Republican 
affiliation probit model with years of private high school instead of overall private years and a 
quadratic term. The results do not support my hypothesis: each additional year of private high 
school is associated with a 1.2 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of aligning with the 
Republican platform and a 1.9 percentage point increase in aligning with the Democratic 
platform, all else equal. Meanwhile, taking the same approach but using a private elementary 
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school dosage variable also fails to support my hypothesis: each additional year of elementary 
school is associated with a .3 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of aligning with the 
Democratic platform and a 1.9 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of aligning with the 
Republican platform, all else equal. All of these estimates are statistically insignificant and must 
be interpreted with caution, as there are only 205 adults in the sample with any private high 
school education and 294 with any elementary high school education.  
 
Conclusion 
  Progressives winced when President Trump appointed Betsy Devos Secretary of 
Education. Parroting her call that market-based education reforms would “advance God’s 
Kingdom,” they successfully fashioned a narrative that school choice is driven by conservative 
and corporate machinations and that private schools are factories of future conservative voters 
(Segar, M., 2017). Empirical evidence casts doubt over that narrative: Spending a few years in a 
private school appears to have a large liberalizing effect while spending 12 years in one makes 
an individual practically indistinguishable from their exclusively public school educated 
counterparts. This does not mean that increased access to vouchers would have been the 
difference in the 2000 or 2016 elections; it is impossible to say whether the effect would be the 
same in magnitude or even direction with a different population. Similarly, one should be 
cautious in concluding that increased access to vouchers in the future will shrink the Republican 
voter base. However, it does provide evidence that private schools are not the path to God’s 
Kingdom as Devos and likeminded allies hope nor the road to political ruin that progressives 
fear.   
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Appendix  
 
1A.  
2012 Voter turnout 
   
 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Private years 0.011 
(0.016) 
0.012 
(0.016) 
0.010 
(0.016) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.016) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.015) 
Private years2 -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Age 0.022*** 
(0.004) 
0.022*** 
(0.004) 
0.020*** 
(0.004) 
0.018*** 
(0.004) 
0.020*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
Age2 -0.000*** 
(-0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
Female -0.013 
(0.023) 
-0.011 
(0.023) 
0.009 
(0.024) 
0.005 
(0.022) 
-0.013 
(0.023) 
-0.024 
(0.022) 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
Black 0.200*** 
(0.049) 
0.208*** 
(0.050) 
0.230*** 
(0.049) 
0.221*** 
(0.049) 
0.175*** 
(0.050) 
0.191*** 
(0.050) 
0.184*** 
(0.051) 
Catholic 0.072** 
(0.032) 
0.072** 
(0.032) 
0.071** 
(0.032) 
0.051* 
(0.030) 
0.069** 
(0.032) 
0.046 
(0.030) 
0.034 
(0.029) 
Protestant 0.073*** 
(0.028) 
0.072*** 
(0.028) 
0.056** 
(0.028) 
0.055** 
(0.027) 
0.066** 
(0.028) 
0.051* 
(0.027) 
0.034 
(0.026) 
Not enough money -0.086* 
(0.045) 
-0.088** 
(0.044) 
-0.079* 
(0.044) 
-0.061 
(0.045) 
-0.087* 
(0.045) 
-0.064 
(0.045) 
-0.056 
(0.046) 
Liberalism 
- 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
- - - - 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
Intelligence 
- - 
0.019*** 
(0.005) 
- - - 
0.004 
(0.005) 
Household Income 
bracket 
- - - 
0.022*** 
(0.003) 
- - 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
Church attendance 
- - - - 
0.054*** 
(0.014) 
- 
0.045*** 
(0.014) 
Educational 
attainment 
- - - - - 
0.102*** 
(0.012) 
0.079*** 
(0.013) 
Prob>chi2 (private 
years and private 
years2) 
0.591 0.578 0.687  0.813 0.5199 0.899 0.799 
Observations 1,644 1,643 1,644 1,641 1,610 1,644 1,606 
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1B.  
2014 Voter turnout 
   
 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Private years 0.008 
(0.019) 
0.009 
(0.019) 
0.006 
(0.018) 
0.005 
(0.018) 
0.007 
(0.018) 
0.000 
(0.017) 
0.001 
(0.017) 
Private years2 -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Age 0.024*** 
(0.005) 
0.024*** 
(0.005) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.021*** 
(0.005) 
Age2 -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
Female -0.058** 
(0.027) 
-0.056** 
(0.027) 
-0.040 
(0.028) 
-0.042 
(0.027) 
-0.066** 
(0.027) 
-0.073*** 
(0.026) 
-0.067** 
(0.027) 
Black 0.077 
(0.058) 
0.086 
(0.059) 
0.102* 
(0.060) 
0.088 
(0.059) 
0.073 
(0.060) 
0.068 
(0.059) 
0.072 
(0.064) 
Catholic 0.055 
(0.040) 
0.055 
(0.040) 
0.055 
(0.040) 
0.038 
(0.039) 
0.053 
(0.040) 
0.026 
(0.038) 
0.017 
(0.038) 
Protestant 0.083** 
(0.033) 
0.081** 
(0.033) 
0.069** 
(0.033) 
0.068** 
(0.033) 
0.076** 
(0.033) 
0.053* 
(0.032) 
0.043 
(0.033) 
Not enough money -0.074 
(0.054) 
-0.071 
(0.054) 
-0.066 
(0.053) 
-0.044 
(0.055) 
-0.054 
(0.055) 
-0.040 
(0.054) 
-0.013 
(0.056) 
Liberalism 
- 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
- - - - 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
Intelligence 
- - 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
- - - 
-0.000 
(0.006) 
Household Income 
bracket 
- - - 
0.022*** 
(0.004) 
- - 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
Church attendance 
- - - - 
0.065*** 
(0.017) 
- 
0.052*** 
(0.017) 
Educational 
attainment 
- - - - - 
0.110*** 
(0.014) 
0.092*** 
(0.016) 
Prob>chi2 (private 
years and private 
years2) 
0.905 0.877 0.895 0.869 0.866 0.629 0.502 
Observations 1,532 1,531 1,532 1,529 1,506 1,532 1,502 
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1C.  
2016 Voter turnout 
   
 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Private years 0.009 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.009 
(0.010) 
Private years2 -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Age 0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
Age2 -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Female -0.004 
(0.017) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
0.004 
(0.017) 
0.001 
(0.017) 
-0.004 
(0.017) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
-0.002 
(0.017) 
Black -0.004 
(0.029) 
-0.007 
(0.030) 
0.006 
(0.029) 
0.002 
(0.028) 
0.009 
(0.030) 
-0.003 
(0.029) 
0.005 
(0.032) 
Catholic 0.016 
(0.021) 
0.017 
(0.021) 
0.015 
(0.021) 
0.012 
(0.021) 
0.017 
(0.021) 
0.011 
(0.021) 
0.011 
(0.021) 
Protestant 0.053*** 
(0.020) 
0.054*** 
(0.020) 
0.047** 
(0.020) 
0.047** 
(0.020) 
0.044** 
(0.020) 
0.046** 
(0.020) 
0.036* 
(0.020) 
Not enough money -0.007 
(0.029) 
-0.008 
(0.029) 
-0.006 
(0.029) 
-0.000 
(0.029) 
-0.015 
(0.029) 
-0.006 
(0.030) 
-0.011 
(0.029) 
Liberalism 
- 
0.002 
(0.003) 
- - - - 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Intelligence 
- - 
0.007* 
(0.003) 
- - - 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Household Income 
bracket 
- - - 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
- - 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
Church attendance 
- - - - 
0.037*** 
(0.010) 
- 
0.038*** 
(0.011) 
Educational 
attainment 
- - - - - 
0.024*** 
(0.009) 
0.016 
(0.010) 
Prob>chi2 (private 
years and private 
years2) 
0.611 0.632 0.569 0.735 0.411 0.618 0.458 
Observations 1,369 1,368 1,369 1,367 1,312 1,369 1,309 
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2A.  
Supported Obama in 2012 
  
 
I II III IV V VI 
Private years 0.003 
(0.017) 
0.003 
(0.017) 
0.006 
(0.017) 
0.006 
(0.017) 
0.000 
(0.017) 
0.006 
(0.017) 
Private years2 -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Age 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Female 0.124*** 
(0.027) 
0.125*** 
(0.029) 
0.115*** 
(0.028) 
0.132*** 
(0.027) 
0.121*** 
(0.027) 
0.110*** 
(0.029) 
Black 0.770*** 
(0.089) 
0.771*** 
(0.090) 
0.749*** 
(0.090) 
0.758*** 
(0.084) 
0.777*** 
(0.090) 
0.734*** 
(0.086) 
Catholic 0.062 
(0.042) 
0.062 
(0.042) 
0.064 
(0.042) 
0.080* 
(0.042) 
0.053 
(0.042) 
0.071* 
(0.041) 
Protestant -0.080** 
(0.035) 
-0.081** 
(0.036) 
-0.073** 
(0.035) 
-0.052 
(0.035) 
-0.093*** 
(0.035) 
-0.057* 
(0.034) 
Not enough money -0.042 
(0.057) 
-0.042 
(0.057) 
-0.064 
(0.056) 
-0.035 
(0.056) 
-0.031 
(0.056) 
-0.052 
(0.053) 
Intelligence 
- 
0.001 
(0.006) 
- - - 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
Household Income 
bracket - - 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
- - 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
Church attendance 
- - - 
-0.079*** 
(0.017) 
- 
-0.086*** 
(0.017) 
Educational 
attainment - - - - 
0.051*** 
(0.014) 
0.081*** 
(0.014) 
Prob>chi2 (private 
years and private 
years2) 
0.865 0.864 0.887 0.910 0.752 0.868 
Observations 1,295 1,295 1,292 1,276 1,295 1,273 
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2B. 
Supported Romney in 2012 
  
 
I II III IV V VI 
Private years 
-0.007 
(0.020) 
-0.008 
(0.020) 
-0.011 
(0.020) 
-0.011 
(0.019) 
-0.005 
(0.019) 
-0.014 
(0.019) 
Private years2 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Age 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Female 
-0.150*** 
(0.030) 
-0.145*** 
(0.032) 
-0.139*** 
(0.030) 
-0.159*** 
(0.030) 
-0.148*** 
(0.030) 
-0.130*** 
(0.032) 
Catholic 
-0.012 
(0.048) 
-0.012 
(0.048) 
-0.018 
(0.047) 
-0.030 
(0.048) 
-0.005 
(0.047) 
-0.0267 
(0.046) 
Protestant 
0.152*** 
(0.039) 
0.150*** 
(0.040) 
0.141*** 
(0.039) 
0.123*** 
(0.039) 
0.162*** 
(0.039) 
0.120*** 
(0.039) 
Not enough money 
-0.005 
(0.065) 
-0.002 
(0.065) 
0.028 
(0.064) 
-0.011 
(0.065) 
-0.018 
(0.065) 
0.0169 
(0.063) 
Intelligence - 
0.004 
(0.006) 
- - - 
0.009 
(0.006) 
Household Income 
bracket 
- - 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
- - 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
Church attendance - - - 
0.081*** 
(0.019) 
- 
0.088*** 
(0.018) 
Educational 
attainment 
- - - - 
-0.040** 
(0.016) 
-0.076*** 
(0.017) 
Prob>chi2 (private 
years and private 
years2) 
0.788 0.787 0.789 0.793 0.725 0.699 
Observations 1,217 1,217 1,215 1,201 1,217 1,199 
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2C.  
Supported Clinton in 2016 
  
 
I II III IV V VI 
Private years 
-0.000 
(0.016) 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
0.002 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.016) 
-0.004 
(0.017) 
-0.001 
(0.017) 
Private years2 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Age 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
Female 
0.107*** 
(0.025) 
0.124*** 
(0.027) 
0.101*** 
(0.026) 
0.115*** 
(0.026) 
0.105*** 
(0.025) 
0.113*** 
(0.027) 
Black 
0.779*** 
(0.076) 
0.798*** 
(0.078) 
0.768*** 
(0.076) 
0.808*** 
(0.081) 
0.778*** 
(0.077) 
0.808*** 
(0.086) 
Catholic 
0.057 
(0.038) 
0.059 
(0.037) 
0.058 
(0.037) 
0.063* 
(0.038) 
0.046 
(0.037) 
0.053 
(0.036) 
Protestant 
-0.007 
(0.032) 
-0.015 
(0.032) 
-0.004 
(0.032) 
0.000 
(0.032) 
-0.016 
(0.032) 
-0.008 
(0.031) 
Not enough money 
0.017 
(0.051) 
0.025 
(0.050) 
0.001 
(0.050) 
0.017 
(0.050) 
0.034 
(0.051) 
0.013 
(0.048) 
Intelligence - 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
- - - 
0.009 
(0.005) 
Household Income 
bracket 
- - 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
- - 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
Church attendance - - - 
-0.073*** 
(0.016) 
- 
-0.079*** 
(0.016) 
Educational 
attainment 
- - - - 
0.060*** 
(0.013) 
0.074*** 
(0.014) 
Prob>chi2 (private 
years and private 
years2) 
0.893 0.922 0.817 0.829 0.963 0.925 
Observations 1,455 1,455 1,452 1,430 1,455 1,427 
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2D.  
 
Supported Trump in 2016 
  
 
I II III IV V VI 
Private years 
-0.032* 
(0.018) 
-0.030* 
(0.018) 
-0.036** 
(0.018) 
-0.033* 
(0.017) 
-0.030* 
(0.018) 
-0.033* 
(0.018) 
Private years2 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Age 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Female 
-0.111*** 
(0.026) 
-0.132*** 
(0.028) 
-0.104*** 
(0.027) 
-0.119*** 
(0.027) 
-0.108*** 
(0.026) 
-0.119*** 
(0.028) 
Black 
-0.805*** 
(0.093) 
-0.825*** 
(0.095) 
-0.796*** 
(0.094) 
-0.804*** 
(0.091) 
-0.805*** 
(0.095) 
-0.808*** 
(0.097) 
Catholic 
-0.085** 
(0.038) 
-0.086** 
(0.038) 
-0.086** 
(0.038) 
-0.087** 
(0.039) 
-0.074* 
(0.038) 
-0.079** 
(0.038) 
Protestant 
-0.026 
(0.033) 
-0.016 
(0.034) 
-0.030 
(0.033) 
-0.029 
(0.033) 
-0.018 
(0.033) 
-0.017 
(0.033) 
Not enough money 
-0.028 
(0.054) 
-0.035 
(0.053) 
-0.011 
(0.053) 
-0.008 
(0.054) 
-0.043 
(0.054) 
0.002 
(0.052) 
Intelligence - 
-0.018*** 
(0.006) 
- - - 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
Household Income 
bracket 
- - 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
- - 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
Church attendance - - - 
0.070*** 
(0.017) 
- 
0.075*** 
(0.016) 
Educational 
attainment 
- - - - 
-0.059*** 
(0.014) 
-0.070*** 
(0.014) 
Prob>chi2 (private 
years and private 
years2) 
0.114 0.175 0.071 0.090 0.203 0.133 
Observations 1,438 1,438 1,435 1,414 1,438 1,411 
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3A. 
Democratic affiliation 
  
 
I II III IV V VI 
Private years 
0.029* 
(0.016) 
0.029* 
(0.016) 
0.030* 
(0.016) 
0.028* 
(0.016) 
0.027 
(0.017) 
0.029* 
(0.017) 
Private years2 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Age 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Female 
0.070*** 
(0.024) 
0.071*** 
(0.025) 
0.063** 
(0.025) 
0.075*** 
(0.024) 
0.067*** 
(0.024) 
0.058** 
(0.026) 
Black 
0.558*** 
(0.054) 
0.559*** 
(0.055) 
0.543*** 
(0.054) 
0.557*** 
(0.055) 
0.555*** 
(0.056) 
0.533*** 
(0.058) 
Catholic 
0.036 
(0.035) 
0.036 
(0.035) 
0.040 
(0.035) 
0.041 
(0.036) 
0.029 
(0.035) 
0.035 
(0.035) 
Protestant 
-0.040 
(0.029) 
-0.041 
(0.030) 
-0.036 
(0.029) 
-0.037 
(0.029) 
-0.048 
(0.029) 
-0.040 
(0.030) 
Not enough money 
0.054 
(0.049) 
0.055 
(0.049) 
0.041 
(0.048) 
0.057 
(0.049) 
0.064 
(0.049) 
0.052 
(0.049) 
Intelligence - 
0.001 
(0.005) 
- - - 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
Household Income 
bracket 
- - 
-0.009** 
(0.003) 
- - 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
Church attendance - - - 
-0.040*** 
(0.015) 
- 
-0.043*** 
(0.015) 
Educational 
attainment 
- - - - 
0.034*** 
(0.013) 
0.056*** 
(0.013) 
Prob>chi2 (private 
years and private 
years2) 
0.195 0.201 0.144 0.191 0.257 0.207 
Observations 1,686 1,686 1,683 1,651 1,686 1,648 
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3B. 
Republican affiliation 
  
 
I II III IV V VI 
Private years 
-0.058*** 
(0.017) 
-0.055*** 
(0.017) 
-0.062*** 
(0.017) 
-0.058*** 
(0.017) 
-0.055*** 
(0.017) 
-0.058*** 
(0.017) 
Private years2 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
Age 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
Female 
-0.080*** 
(0.026) 
-0.104*** 
(0.027) 
-0.067** 
(0.026) 
-0.086*** 
(0.026) 
-0.077*** 
(0.026) 
-0.086*** 
(0.026) 
Black 
-0.584*** 
(0.080) 
-0.608*** 
(0.078) 
-0.564*** 
(0.084) 
-0.576*** 
(0.080) 
-0.590*** 
(0.080) 
-0.583*** 
(0.085) 
Catholic 
-0.035 
(0.038) 
-0.034 
(0.033) 
-0.047 
(0.037) 
-0.050 
(0.038) 
-0.022 
(0.038) 
-0.049 
(0.037) 
Protestant 
0.036 
(0.032) 
0.049 
(0.033) 
0.025 
(0.032) 
0.019 
(0.032) 
0.048 
(0.032) 
0.031 
(0.032) 
Not enough money 
-0.033 
(0.053) 
-0.040 
(0.053) 
-0.010 
(0.052) 
-0.018 
(0.053) 
-0.046 
(0.054) 
-0.010 
(0.051) 
Intelligence - 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
- - - 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
Household Income 
bracket 
- - 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
- - 
0.025*** 
(0.004) 
Church attendance - - - 
0.103*** 
(0.016) 
- 
0.106*** 
(0.015) 
Educational 
attainment 
- - - - 
-0.050*** 
(0.013) 
-0.070*** 
(0.014) 
Prob>chi2 (private 
years and private 
years2) 
0.002 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.002 
Observations 1,686 1,686 1,683 1,651 1,686 1,648 
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3C.  
Liberal self-identification 
  
 
I II III IV V VI 
Private years 
0.083** 
(0.039) 
0.083** 
(0.039) 
0.090** 
(0.039) 
0.075* 
(0.040) 
0.080** 
(0.039) 
0.078* 
(0.041) 
Private years2 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
Age 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Female 
0.205*** 
(0.062) 
0.207*** 
(0.064) 
0.184*** 
(0.062) 
0.237*** 
(0.064) 
0.200*** 
(0.062) 
0.201*** 
(0.065) 
Black 
0.895*** 
(0.125) 
0.897*** 
(0.125) 
0.850*** 
(0.125) 
0.975*** 
(0.130) 
0.892*** 
(0.127) 
0.920*** 
(0.136) 
Catholic 
0.017 
(0.094) 
0.017 
(0.094) 
0.028 
(0.094) 
0.047 
(0.094) 
0.003 
(0.094) 
0.036 
(0.094) 
Protestant 
-0.133* 
(0.077) 
-0.134* 
(0.077) 
-0.122 
(0.077) 
-0.116 
(0.077) 
-0.147* 
(0.077) 
-0.125 
(0.078) 
Not enough money 
-0.037 
(0.144) 
-0.037 
(0.144) 
-0.069 
(0.144) 
-0.075 
(0.149) 
-0.023 
(0.145) 
-0.093 
(0.150) 
Intelligence - 
0.001 
(0.012) 
- - - 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
Household Income 
bracket 
- - 
-0.023*** 
(0.009) 
- - 
-0.032*** 
(0.009) 
Church attendance - - - 
-0.210*** 
(0.041) 
- 
-0.211*** 
(0.041) 
Educational 
attainment 
- - - - 
0.059* 
(0.031) 
0.109*** 
(0.036) 
Prob>chi2 (private 
years and private 
years2) 
0.035 0.035 0.032 0.074 0.029 0.055 
Observations 1,689 1,689 1,686 1,654 1,689 1,651 
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